Does the U.S. genuinely want its European allies to police their geopolitical backyard? When it comes to the Syrian crisis, the answer seems to be no. Last week, the Obama administration signaled that it intends to set the diplomatic pace over Syria as the U.S. and Russia announced joint plans for a peace conference. This was not only an accommodating gesture to the Russians—who, as I argued in this column last week, have made immense political capital out of the conflict—but also a setback for Britain and France, which have agitated for a more hawkish Western line, including arming the Syrian rebels.
British and French diplomats have little choice but to go along with the Russo-American proposal. If the conference is a failure, they may argue that it reinforces the case for a more aggressive approach. But regardless of the outcome, they may also reflect on the paradox that while the Obama administration has frequently called for Europe to take more responsibility for its own security, Washington is often nervous about the results.
Throughout President Barack Obama’s first term, senior American officials emphasized the need for Europe to increase its diplomatic and military capabilities. Playing the good cop, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made considerable efforts to boost the European Union’s nascent External Action Service and its oft-criticized foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. Clinton's first counterpart at the Department of Defense, Robert Gates, was the bad cop, making a series of forthright criticisms about Europe’s lack of military clout as he neared retirement in 2011.
More practically, in 2012, the U.S. announced a reduction of its remaining forces in Europe. European officials frequently grumble about Washington’s pivot to Asia, but they accept it as a fact. This was underlined by a major French defense white paper published at the end of April, which warned that the U.S. is becoming more “selective” in its commitments. As the Economist noted, senior French officials “worry that this could touch not just the Sahel and North Africa, but even Egypt and the Middle East.”
Britain, traditionally obsessive about the Atlantic alliance, has responded to the messages coming from the U.S. by deepening defense cooperation with France. Paris and London have also worked in tandem on both Libya and Syria, and the U.K. hastened to assist the French intervention in Mali. This cross-channel diplomacy is peripheral to the great debates inside the EU about austerity and the eurozone and, as I have previously noted, it has sometimes alienated Germany. But it looks very much like the first steps toward the development of the self-sufficient European security agenda the Americans say they want.
There are only two problems with this. First, however effectively they cooperate, European powers are still trapped in a cycle of defense cuts. Their limitations as military crisis managers are likely to increase rather than diminish in the years ahead. Second, the Obama administration seems to think that European diplomatic decision-making in recent crises has been at best erratic and at worst feckless.
Read more: WPR Article | Diplomatic Fallout: A More Hawkish Europe Gives U.S. Second Thoughts
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